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Abstract
This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree of mobility
of private capital across jurisdictions boundaries is perfect. The optimal tax on mobile capital is a source tax
that taxes away factor rents. Further we show that taxation of mobile capital can redistribute income in favor
of the immobile factor labor. This is because the factor rents generated by public inputs and appropriated by
mobile capital exceed the efficient level of public expenditure for investments.
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1. Introduction
A common paradigm in the field of tax competition is that taxes on mobile capital are
not effective instruments to finance social programs or transfers to private households
and thus redistribution of income (Oates, 1999). The standard analysis of the incidence
of a source tax on capital revenue levied by a small open jurisdiction puts forth that
the tax is borne by the immobile factor labor or local consumers. The struggle between
capital and labor over the distribution of the national income thus cannot be influenced
by the government in favor of immobile workers. The economic intuition behind this
view is that under the source principle of taxation there is a tendency to equate the net
of tax rate of interest across borders. From the perspective of a small open jurisdiction,
a source tax on capital income increases the costs of capital in the jurisdiction and
thus leads to capital outflows which again lower labor income (Wildasin and Wilson,
2004; Wildasin, 2003). In the words of Wildasin (2000), the immobile workers are left
“holding the bag”. The difficulty of carrying out redistributive taxation in the context
of jurisdictional competition has been discussed mainly in static models emphasizing
household mobility, migration externalities and problems of adverse selection.1
Recently Wildasin (2003) challenges the proposition that local capital taxes cannot
be used to finance transfers to immobile households. He analyzes fiscal competition
among jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework, where it is costly and time-
consuming to adjust factor stocks, so the degree of capital mobility between jurisdictions
is imperfect.2 This limited mobility makes it possible to tax private capital and redistribute
income in the short run. Nevertheless in the long run taxation of mobile factors to
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redistribute income in favor of the owners of immobile resources becomes harmful. A
similar message emerges from a dynamic model of imperfectly mobile capital developed
by Wilson (1996).
The goal of the analysis presented here is to show a case where in a setting of perfect
capital mobility fiscal policy allows for redistribution between perfectly mobile capital
and immobile households in the long run. The theoretical framework presented in this
paper differs in some respect from that used by Wildasin (2003). First, as mentioned,
we assume private capital to be perfectly mobile across jurisdictional boundaries. Sec-
ond, we assume that the government provides productive public inputs3 that can be
considered as marginal product complements to private production factors and gener-
ate factor rents only to mobile capital.4 Third, we consider a small open and growing
economy in which the owner of the immobile resource is treated as a representative
single agent, who lives for two periods and in private decisions only cares about him-
self or herself and not about future generations, whereas Wildasin (2003) assumes an
infinitely-lived private household. In addition, the government seeks to promote social
welfare that is defined as the discounted utility functions of present and future genera-
tions. However, this distinguishing feature is not that important for the outcome of our
model.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3
we deduce the welfare optimizing tax and investment strategy of a single small, open
jurisdiction, where public decision-makers cannot directly control private investment or
consumption but influence it through their tax instruments and the supply of produc-
tive infrastructure. Since taxation and infrastructure are factors in location decisions of
mobile capital, jurisdictions simultaneously compete by means of tax and expenditure
policies. To finance productive public infrastructure the government can choose between
a source-based tax on capital revenue and a flat rate tax on wages. Section 4 concludes
briefly.
2. Dynamic Fiscal Competition with a Public Input
2.1. Production Technology
Our first focus is the time-invariant production technology used in the jurisdiction. There
are three factors of production: labor Lt , private capital Kt , and publicly provided cap-
ital Gt which are used by private firms to produce one homogeneous good Yt at time
t . The price of Yt is normalized to unity. Capital is simply non-consumed output. The
production function F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) = Yt exhibits positive diminishing marginal prod-
ucts with respect to each input, the Inada conditions hold, and technical progress is
neglected. All factors are complements in the sense that the second-order cross deriva-
tions of F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) are positive. The public capital stock Gt yields only production
benefits, so that households are not immediate beneficiaries of public capital. The pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns in Lt , Kt , and Gt . It is therefore concave and
homogeneous to the degree of 1 and the public input can be interpreted as a publicly
provided private good of “unpaid factor type”. This assumption is crucial for our re-
sult and is still supported with some empirical evidence (Gramlich, 1994; Reiter and
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Weichenrieder, 1997). We assume that the government provides such public investment
because exclusion is not possible and a market solution is thus unsatisfactory.
If the production function exhibits constant returns in Lt , Kt , and Gt , the output Yt can
be decomposed into the imputed shares of labor, private capital and government capital
according to Euler’s theorem. Yet because the government supplies its services free of
charge, entire output is not exhausted if all private inputs were paid their partial marginal
product represented by the first partial derivative of F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) with respect to Kt .5 In
the following, we focus on a specific kind of public capital that is bound on private capital,
so that private capital has some way to appropriate the public inputs’ benefits and convert
them into private capital income (Gramlich, 1994). Thus the government effectively
provides a firm with Gt/Kt units of public capital for each unit of private capital that it
employs, where this ratio is fixed at its socially optimal level. It follows that the marginal
revenue of private capital is ∂ F(Lt , Kt , Gt )/∂Kt +[∂ F(Lt , Kt , Gt )/∂Gt ] (Gt/Kt ). Note
that public ownership of Gt does not generate rents that directly enter the public budget.
Gt is provided by the jurisdictional government in order to accommodate mobile
capital6 and can thus be considered as an instrument in jurisdictional competition. How-
ever, public infrastructure that generates a rent to mobile capital is not the only possible
public input. More generally, we could assume that the government effectively provides
a firm with ωGt/Kt units of public capital for each unit of private capital it employs, and
(1−ω)Gt/Lt units of public capital for each unit of labor.7 We discuss the general case,
where private capital appropriates only a fraction ω < 1 of the public capital income,
only briefly in note 10 and 11.
2.2. The Public and Private Sector
2.2.1. Firms In the private sector, investment decisions are made by profit-maximizing
firms. Capital has two costs to the firm, the rental price rt and a source-based tax on
capital revenue, where θK ,t denotes the capital tax rate. The RHS of (1) represent the user
costs of private capital and the LHS of (1) can be considered as the marginal productivity
of capital that exceeds the first partial derivative of F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) with respect to Kt in
this model. The firms invest capital up to the point where the marginal revenue of private
investment equals the costs8:
∂ F(Lt , Kt , Gt )
∂Kt
+ ∂ F(Lt , Kt , Gt )
∂Gt
Gt
Kt
= rt
1 − θK ,t . (1)
Since firms are free to invest and produce domestically or abroad, net of tax return
of capital is the same everywhere rt = r∗ and the supply of capital is completely
price elastic.9 The marginal productivity of capital equals r∗/(1 − θK ,t ), so the share of
domestic income received by private capital is Ktr∗/(1 − θK ,t ). The aggregate domestic
wage income Wt is a residual given by:
Yt − Kt r
∗
(1 − θK ,t ) = Wt . (2)
2.2.2. Households The household sector is designed according to the overlapping
-generations model (Wildasin and Wilson, 1996). All people live for two periods, so
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at each point in time there are an old and a young generation living side by side. An
individual born at time t supplies a fixed amount of labor and pays a proportional tax
rate θL ,t on per capita wage income wt = Wt/Lt . The economy’s population grows at an
exogenous rate n, thus Lt+1 = (1+n)Lt . Since labor is supplied inelastically, the wage tax
can be considered as equivalent to a lump sum tax. Note that the wage tax can be negative
and thus be interpreted as a subsidy or a transfer to the households. From the perspective
of the private agents, the fiscal parameters Gt , θK ,t , and θL ,t are exogenous. Each young
person consumes ct of the net income and saves the remainder st = (1 − θL ,t )wt − cyt .
In the second period of his life the individual consumes all his wealth, both interest and
principal st (1+r∗) = cot+1. Like firms, private households have access to the world capital
market so r∗ is the time-invariant return on private saving. Domestic and foreign claims
on capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes as stores of value and no residence based
tax on capital income is levied. The decision problem for young people is to maximize
the lifetime log utility function u(cyt , cot+1) = ln cyt + ϑ ln cot+1, with 0 < ϑ < 1, subject
to the budget constraint
c
y
t = (1 − θL ,t ) wt −
cot+1
(1 + r∗) (3)
so that the optimal consumption of somebody born in t while old is cot+1 = ϑ(1 + r∗)cyt .
The parameter ϑ denotes the subjective discount factor.
2.2.3. Government The budget constraint of the public sector is given by
Gt+1 − (1 − χ )Gt − θL ,t Wt − θK ,t (Yt − Wt ) = 0. (4)
The government’s total tax revenue is the sum of the capital tax revenue (Yt − Wt ) θK ,t
and the wage tax revenue WtθL ,t . Both tax rates are allowed to be time-variant. Public
investment is Gt+1−(1−χ )Gt , where χ denotes the depreciation rate. We leave open the
possibility that the jurisdiction will choose negative tax rates and thus subsidize capital
or labor. The residuum of the capital tax revenue minus the investment expenditures is
the amount of wage tax borne by the workers or the transfer paid to them, if positive.
Public consumption is neglected in the model.
3. The Welfare Maximizing Tax and Investment Strategy
of an Autonomous Jurisdiction
Since we seek the optimal tax and investment strategy of an autonomous jurisdiction it is
necessary to specify a criterion function by which optimality can be judged. Therefore we
assume that the government has the objective to maximize the utility of its residents and
discounts the utility of future generations at rate λ. This implies an infinite-horizon social
welfare function of the form  = u(cot )+
∑∞
t=1 (1 + λ)1−t u(cyt , cot+1). If the government
cares less about future generations, λ is positive.  converges under the condition of
a positive social discount rate λ and the stationarity assumption of u(cyt , cot+1). The
government maximizes the welfare function subject to the two private constraints (1)
and (3), the optimality condition of the private household cot+1 = ϑ(1 + r∗)cyt , and the
public budget constraint (4). Further, an additional constraint holds that G1 is given.
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Accordingly, the Lagrangian expression is
Z
(
θK ,t , θL ,t , Gt+1, cyt , Kt
)
=  +
∞
∑
t=1
μt [θL ,t Wt + θK ,t (Yt − Wt ) − Gt+1 + (1 − χ ) Gt ]
+
∞
∑
t=1
ρt [(Yt − Wt ) − (Yt − Wt )θK ,t − r∗Kt ]
+
∞
∑
t=1
δt
[
Wt
Lt
− Wt
Lt
θL ,t − (1 + ϑ) cyt
]
(5)
where the Lagrange multipliers μt , ρt , and δt are functions of the time t .
3.1. Optimal Source Tax
From the first-order conditions of the optimization problem—presented in the
Appendix—we first deduce the optimal source tax rate
θ∗K ,t =
(Yt − Wt ) − ∂Yt∂Kt Kt
(Yt − Wt ) (6)
From equations (1) and (6) it can be seen that the optimal local public policy taxes away
the rents appropriated by the private capital so that the corresponding tax revenue
θ∗K ,t
[
Kt
∂Yt
∂Kt
+ ∂Yt
∂Gt
Gt
]
= ∂Yt
∂Gt
Gt
equals exactly the share of public capital income (∂Yt/∂Gt )Gt . Further, it becomes
clear that only public capital that generates a capital rent justifies the taxation of mobile
capital.10
Note that in period t the optimal capital tax revenue is not directly dependent on the
level of public expenditure and that if θK ,t = θ∗K ,t , the partial productivity of private
capital ∂Yt/∂Kt equals exactly r∗. From (3) we know that r∗ is the return on private
savings no matter whether these savings are invested in the jurisdiction or somewhere
else. Thus the private capital will now be exactly as productive within the jurisdiction
as its opportunity costs to the residence. Lowering taxation of the mobile capital would
lower the productivity of private capital in the jurisdiction beyond its opportunity costs
and the gain of wage income induced by the capital inflow would not be compensated
by the loss of tax revenue. Since the public budget must be balanced in each period, this
loss of tax revenue either lowers the subsidies paid to the private household or raises
wage taxes. On the other hand a tax rate above θ∗K ,t would raise the marginal productivity
of private capital above the opportunity costs of private capital.
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3.1.1. Benefit Tax This result of an optimal source tax on capital rents points to a view
on fiscal competition held by Oates and Schwab (1991) and Oates (1999) and discussed
by Gerber and Hewitt (1987), Richter (1994) and Zodrow (2001). According to them,
the incidence of a source tax is quite different from the classical view (Wellisch, 2000;
Wildasin, 2003; Wildasin and Wilson, 2004). The intuition is that if the capital tax revenue
is used by the government to supply public infrastructure that improves the productivity
of private capital, the tax-induced increase of the costs of capital in the jurisdiction will be
compensated by an increase in the return of capital and thus counteract the capital outflow.
Arguing in the Tiebout tradition, Oates (1999) takes the view that if many jurisdictions
compete against one another, all taxes levied by the jurisdiction will become user charges
for local public goods. In this context a source-based capital tax should be interpreted
as a price for public services. Nevertheless, as shown by equation (6) a benefit tax on
private capital is only justified if public infrastructure generates a factor rent on private
capital.
3.2. A Modified Golden Rule of Government Investment
This section investigates how much of the optimal source tax revenue—equivalent
to the output share of the public capital—must be used to finance public inputs and
whether some revenue of a source-based capital tax can be used to finance transfers
or a negative wage tax to private households. As is well known, taxes are not ear-
marked so the source tax revenue need not compellingly be pumped into public in-
vestment expenditure. Whether the wage tax is positive or negative depends on the
relation of the public investment level and the appropriated income share of public
capital. If the tax revenue exceeds public investment, the wage tax rate becomes nega-
tive which means that workers receive income transfer from the government. Thus the
question that suggests itself is what level of investment a benevolent government will
choose.
From the optimization problem (5) we receive the optimal investment path of the
jurisdictional government as
∂Yt+1
∂Gt+1
= (1 + λ)(1 + n)
∂u(cyt ,cot+1(cyt ))
∂c
y
t
∂u(cyt+1,cot+2(cyt+1))
∂c
y
t+1
− (1 − χ ) (7)
(see Appendix for details). Equation (7) is a condition for optimal intertemporal alloca-
tion. It can be interpreted as a modified golden rule of government investment (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 74). Condition (7) states that decreasing lifetime consumption
for the individuals working in period (t) leads to a decrease of their utility Lt ∂u(c
y
t )
∂c
y
t
but makes an increase in utility of the individuals working in period (t + 1) possible
through public capital accumulation. According to the optimality condition, this utility
increase discounted to t using the social discount rate λ has to equal the initial utility
decrease.
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3.3. Redistribution in the Steady State
According to the public budget constraint (4), condition (2) and (6), the wage tax revenue
is the residual
Gt+1 − (1 − χ )Gt − Gt ∂Yt
∂Gt
= θL ,t Wt . (8)
It is negative if the aggregate investment level of the government is lower than the optimal
capital tax revenue. In the steady state the per capita amounts of the public capital stock
gt = Gt/Lt is constant over time, so gt = gt+1 holds. Thus the aggregate steady state
investment level of the government is (n +χ )Gt . In the long run, the wage tax revenue is
negative and thus a transfer to workers if (n+χ ) is less than the marginal productivity of
public capital. From (7) we know that this condition always holds, if the social discount
rate λ is positive, so that the government does not invest according to Ramsey’s golden
rule of investment, but according to the modified golden rule.11 To illustrate our results,
we make the assumption that the production function shows constant output elasticity
with respect to labor α, private capital β and public capital ε, with α +β + ε = 1. Using
(1) and (5), we receive the optimal capital tax rate θ∗K = ε/(β + ε) and the capital tax
revenue εYt . Under the assumptions made, in the long run the marginal productivity of
public capital is time-invariant and equals εYt/Gt = (1 + λ)(1 + n) − (1 −χ ). Thus the
tax burden borne by the immobile factor labor is given by θL Wt = −λ(1 + n)Gt .
Let us briefly compare this result with that derived by Oates and Schwab (1991),
Wellisch (1995, p. 83) and Gerber and Hewitt (1987, p. 456) who make assumptions about
technology that are very similar to our model. These authors suggest that decentralized
levels of government should avoid non-benefit taxes on highly mobile capital (Oates,
1999, p. 1125). According to Oates and Schwab (1991, p. 127) one “...can not expect
to find that revenue from local taxes levied on business would be used to fund social
programs, parks, education and the like.” They conclude that the source tax revenue has
to be entirely used to finance public inputs. Since the authors argue in a one-period model,
they cover the case where a benevolent government does not care about intertemporal
social welfare but just maximizes steady state welfare. Applied to our model, the authors
argue under the condition that λ = 0, under which even in a growing economy all source
tax revenue must be used to finance public investments and no tax revenue is left over
for redistribution. Comparing the discussed static models with our model, their different
assumption about the social discount rate causes different results.
4. Conclusion
This paper presents an explicitly dynamic analysis of fiscal competition under the as-
sumption of perfect capital mobility. Additionally, we assume that the government of
a small and autonomous jurisdiction provides productive public inputs of the so-called
“unpaid factor type” that create rents which can be appropriated by the private capital.
Thus private capital is paid more than its partial marginal product, i.e. the first partial
derivative of F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) with respect to Kt . Our analysis shows that a benevolent
public decision-maker within a decentralized, autonomous jurisdiction prefers a source
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tax on mobile capital that taxes away factor rents to a wage tax on immobile labor. We
further demonstrate that portions of the source tax revenue can be used for redistribu-
tive programs, as income transfers to immobile private households. Nevertheless, our
results are based on the conditions that (i) private capital can appropriate public inputs’
benefits and that (ii) the benevolent government maximizes an intertemporal welfare
by discounting the utility of future generations at a positive factor. Under this condi-
tion, the modified golden rule of public investment deduced in the model states that the
factor rents generated by public inputs exceed the optimal steady state level of public
investment.
Appendix
This Appendix presents some results derived in the text.
A. Derivation of (6)
∂Z
∂θL ,t Wt
= μt − δt 1Lt = 0 (9)
∂Z
∂θK ,t (Yt − Wt ) = μt − ρt = 0 (10)
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= ρt+1
[
∂(Yt+1 − Wt+1)
∂Kt+1
− r∗
]
+ δt+1
[
∂Wt+1
Lt+1∂Kt+1
]
= 0 (11)
ρt+1 = −
δt+1
[
∂Wt+1
Lt+1∂Kt+1
]
[
∂ (Yt+1−Wt+1)
∂Kt+1
− r∗]
∂Z
∂c
y
t
= (1 + λ)−t ∂u
(
c
y
t
)
∂c
y
t
− δt (1 + ϑ) = 0 δt = (1 + λ)
−t
1 + ϑ
∂u
∂c
y
t
(12)
Substituting (12) into (9)
μt = (1 + λ)
−t
1 + ϑ
∂u
(
c
y
t
)
∂c
y
t
1
Lt
Substituting (12) into (10)
μt = −
(1+λ)−t
1+ϑ
∂u(cyt )
∂c
y
t
[
∂Wt
Lt ∂Kt
]
[
∂(Yt −Wt )
∂Kt
− r∗]
From (2) we know r∗t = (Yt −Wt )−θK ,t (Yt −Wt )Kt which leads to the optimal tax rate presented
in equation (6).
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B. Derivation of (7)
∂Z
∂Gt+1
= −μt + μt+1(1 − χ ) + ρt+1
[
∂( Yt+1 − Wt+1)
∂Gt+1
]
+ δt+1
[
∂Wt+1
Lt+1∂Gt+1
]
= 0 (13)
Eliminating the Lagrange parameters μt , μt+1, ρt+1, and δt+1 and replacing θ∗K ,t ac-
cording to (5) we receive the modified golden rule of public investment presented in
(7).
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Notes
1. For a survey of the literature see Wellisch (2000).
2. Wildasin (2003) provides a brief survey of previous studies in the field of intertemporal fiscal competition.
3. Public input within a fiscal competition framework has been discussed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), Gerber and Hewitt (1987), Oates and Schwab (1991), Taylor (1992), Richter (1994), Richter and
Wellisch (1996), Keen and Marchand (1997), and others (see Matsumoto (2000) and references therein).
Most of these authors focus on the question whether tax competition leads to a sub-optimal provision of
public inputs by employing different tax instruments, different assumptions about the number of competing
jurisdictions and their strategic interaction. In principle they confirm the well-known underprovision result
of public inputs in tax competition. The possibility of overprovision is discussed by Bayindir-Upmann
(1998), Noiset (1995) and Noiset and Oakland (1995). In none of the models would it be efficient to
impose a source tax on a mobile tax base that exceeds the costs of providing public inputs.
4. Most tax competition studies of local public inputs presented in the literature focus either on the factor-
augmenting type of public input that generate no rents, or on public inputs of the unpaid factor type
that only generate rents to the immobile factor. Richter (1994) and Matsumoto (1998, 2000) allow for
firm-augmenting public inputs that benefit mobile firms. Gerber and Hewitt (1987) and Oates and Schwab
(1991) consider public inputs that generate rents to mobile capital. Feehan (1989) reviews alternative
specifications of public input. Sinn (1997) does not focus on the role of public goods in the production
function, but on the costs of using public infrastructure and according congestion externality.
5. Euler’s Theorem states that under homogeneity of degree 1, a function can be reduced to the sum of its
arguments multiplied by its first partial derivatives.
6. Because all production factors are complements in the sense that the second-order cross derivations of
F(Lt , Kt , Gt ) are positive, there are additionally so called indirect productivity effects on private labor
and private capital. Nevertheless, we will show that this indirect productivity effect does not justify to tax
mobile capital.
7. In addition we could assume that the public inputs is of the so-called “creation of atmosphere type” and
thus generate no factor rents. In this case, the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale in
all three inputs, but constant returns to scale in the private inputs alone. The “factor-augmenting type” of
public input discussed by Matsumoto (1998) is similar to the “creation of atmosphere type” described by
Meade (1952).
8. Kim und Wilson (1997) present a model where pollution emissions replace the public input Gt and the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale in capital, labor and pollution emission. In the
model, labor appropriates the factor rent generated by pollution.
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9. In the standard model of a small open economy private and public decision makers face an exogenous
world interest rate, whereas the tax and investment policy of a more centralized government may affect
the world interest rate.
10. If the publicly supplied capital is entirely bound by an immobile factor or if it is from the creation
of atmosphere type, private capital cannot appropriate any rents. Equation (2) shows that in this case
(Yt − Wt ) = ∂Yt∂Kt Kt holds and θ∗K ,t = 0. This is the well known result of Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986), according to which the government does not tax mobile capital to finance any kind of public
expenditure. If only a part 0 < ω < 1 of the public infrastructure supply accrues to private capital the
optimal source tax revenue is ω ∂Yt
∂Gt Gt . In an environment of tax competition and perfect capital mobility
the assumption ω > 0 is necessary to make a source tax an efficient tax instrument at all (Oates and
Schwab, 1991; Gerber and Hewitt, 1987).
11. If we again make the assumption that private capital appropriates only a fraction ω < 1 of the public
capital income, the wage tax becomes negative if λ > (1−ω)
ω
(χ+n)
(1+n) holds. If the population growth and the
depreciation rate are assumed to be very small, public investment that is needed to maintain the public
capital stock (n + χ )Gt is also very small. For a positive social discount rate λ the optimal source tax
revenue ω ∂Yt
∂Gt Gt may exceed this investment expenditure even if ω is considerable less than one.
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